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More than ever, the competition to lead the technological race puts artificial 
intelligence in the centre of the global power play. The idea of a potential mortal weapon 
system that does not require a human agent on the loop is far from being just an academic 
hypothesis and the question arises on whom to allocate responsibility for its unlawful 
acts.  
Being a current topic, transversal to several legal and ethical issues, the focus of 
the present dissertation will remain on the possibility of accountability for Autonomous 
Weapon System’s unlawful acts in International Armed Conflicts. 
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Atualmente, mais do que nunca, a competição para liderar a corrida tecnológica 
coloca a inteligência artificial no centro do poder global. A ideia de um sistema de 
armamento autónomo que não requer a intervenção de um agente humano durante a sua 
operação está longe de representar uma mera hipótese académica levantando-se, assim, 
a questão de saber a quem imputar a responsabilidade por atuações ilegais. 
Sendo um tópico atual, transversal a várias questões éticas e jurídicas, o foco da 
presente dissertação permanecerá na possibilidade de imputação da responsabilidade 
por atos ilegais de sistemas de armamento autónomo em situação de Conflito Armado 
Internacional. 
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Internacional Humanitário; Responsabilidade; Direito Internacional Criminal; 




I am grateful for growing up in a family with strong values, that gave me the tools 
to be independent and think by myself, that gave me the joy in the hardest times, that 
raised me to be resilient and never doubt I can always challenge myself more. Thank you 
to all my family, in particular my mother, Tio Tino and Tia Tina, I owe them everything 
and love them with all my heart.  
 On a special note, I will never be able to thank Alois to the extent he truly deserves, 
thank you for allowing me to conquer everything I set out to be. Without a doubt, he is 
my main inspiration, I thank God he became part of our family. 
To my teacher and supervisor, Dr. Azeredo Lopes, who has guided me throughout 
this intense project and has always challenged me to present the best version possible of 
this dissertation.  
To Cecilia, for giving me the much needed strength and considered inputs on my 
thoughts.  
To my friends who have always been understanding and supportive in all the goals 
I set out to achieve. 
Last, but certainly not least, thank you to João, my partner, my best friend, my 
biggest supporter and my shelter, whenever I needed one. Thank you with all my heart 








Table of Contents 
 
Acronyms ......................................................................................................... 10 
Introduction ..................................................................................................... 12 
1. Conceptual Complexity ................................................................................ 14 
1.1 Defining Artificial Intelligence .................................................................... 14 
1.2 Autonomous Weapon Systems .................................................................... 15 
1.2.1.Addressing the different typologies of AWS ............................................. 16 
2. AI in Warfare: Challenges posed to International Law ............................. 20 
2.1 Regulation versus Total Ban of AWS .......................................................... 21 
3. Relevant Legal Framework ......................................................................... 24 
3.1. Jus ad Bellum ............................................................................................. 24 
3.2. Jus in Bello and International Human Rights Law ...................................... 25 
3.3. International Criminal Law......................................................................... 26 
4. Ascertaining the legality of AWS under IHL .............................................. 27 
4.1. Martens Clause ........................................................................................... 27 
4.2. Principles of International Humanitarian Law............................................. 28 
A. Principle of Proportionality   ............................................................. 29 
B. Principle of Distinction   ................................................................... 29 
4.2.1. Preliminary conclusions: can AWS be considered categorically prohibited 
under IHL. ................................................................................................................. 30 
4.3. The obligation of weapons review: particular challenges ............................ 34 
5. General Remarks on Accountability  .......................................................... 36 
5.1. Elements of international criminal accountability ........................................ 36 
A. Legality Principle  ............................................................................. 36 
B. Mental element/ mens rea ............................................................................ 37 
6. International Responsibility for unlawful acts carried through AWS  ...... 39 
9 
 
6.1. Ascertaining States Responsibility for AWS unlawful acts ......................... 40 
6.2. Individual Criminal Responsibility ............................................................. 43 
A. Programmer  ..................................................................................... 44 
B. Command Responsibility .................................................................. 46 
6.3. Relations between individual and State Responsibility ............................... 48 
6.4. Preliminary Conclusions on Accountability for AWS unlawful acts ........... 49 
7. Refusing Impunity ....................................................................................... 51 
7.1. International Binding Protocol on the development and deployment of weapons 
capable of operating autonomously ............................................................................. 51 
7.2. International Political Declaration ............................................................... 53 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 55 

















AI: Artificial Intelligence 
AP: Additional Protocol  
ARSIWA: Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts  
Art. º: article 
AWS: Autonomous Weapon Systems 
CCW: Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons 
Ed.: edition 
Et seq.: and what follows 
GEE: Group of Group of Governmental Experts 
IAC: International Armed Conflict 
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ICL: International Criminal Law 
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IHRL: International Human Rights Law 
IL: International Law 
ILC: International Law Commission 
IO: International Organizations  
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Not so long ago, the world witnessed catastrophic consequences caused by the 
unpredictability of war. During the World War II thousands of people lost their lives and 
generations disappeared from the Earth in the hands of ethnic cleansing and mass 
extermination politics.  
At the time, Nazi leaders were held responsible for crimes against humanity and 
war crimes, but not under the crime of Genocide, leading Winston Churchill to remark 
that we were “in the presence of a crime without a name”. 
If in fact at the time the Law could have not foreseen what eventually happened, 
the same cannot be stated about the eminent use of Autonomous Weapon Systems 
(AWS) in the battlefield and the complex challenges that poses to the Law.  
AWS are fundamentally different from previous forms of weaponry, being the 
main difference the fact that it doesn’t simply react to triggers. In fact, AWS are being 
developed to perform in a warfare context without relying on direct human input and 
with the ability of self-learning while operating. 
As fascinating and almost herculean as those capabilities may be, the fact that those 
who plan a military operation have less influence than they previously had, along with 
the paradox created by the increased levels of autonomy1, poses major challenges to 
international legislators regarding the assignment of accountability. 
While the context of war may be unimaginable for some, it is catastrophic for all. 
And even if the establishment of world peace is not realistically possible, there should 
be at least, some peace in knowing that those who commit crimes will be held 
responsible. 
But due to its inherent characteristics, it does not appear clear who could be held 
accountable for an illegal act where no human agent engaged directly. Faced with the 
vast possibility of holding responsible engineers, programmers, manufacturers, robot 
 
1Wagner, M. “The Dehumanization of International Humanitarian Law: Legal, Ethical, and Political 
Implications of Autonomous Weapon Systems”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 47, No 
1371 (2014), 1371-1424. P.1400. 
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controllers or supervisors, state governments or commanders2, some authors even add 
that this might be the first time a “weapon system will have either no one or too many 
people to held accountable for mistakes”.3 
Given that some argue that in many scenarios we would be facing an 
“accountability gap”, there is a pressing need to ascertain whether existing binding 
International Law has proper instruments do deal with the legal consequences of this new 
emerging reality.  
Therefore, this dissertation aims to address the accountability matter on the 
potential use of AWS between States in situations of international armed conflict (IAC) 













2Solovyeva, A.; Hynek, N. “Going Beyond the “Killer Robots” Debate: Six Dilemmas Autonomous 
Weapon Systems Raise, Central European Journal of International and Security Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3, 
(2018), 166–208. P.194.  




1. Conceptual complexity 
Covering different areas of knowledge, from mathematics to engineering, from 
neuroscience to Law and Ethics, this complex new topic brings as much excitement as 
contention to the table of international discussion. 
Due to their complexity, most of the concepts that surround AI do not reach 
consensus within the international community. In this chapter we will be discussing the 
various approaches and definitions in order to better understand the scope of this 
dissertation. 
 
1.1 Defining Artificial Intelligence 
AI can be defined as a discipline whose purpose lies in the “construction of 
artificial entities with cognitive capacities similar to those of human beings”4 which 
develops intelligent programs that enable computer systems to think and make decisions 
for them – autonomous systems.5 
Based mainly on algorithms, AI requires deep mathematical knowledge “as well 
as mechanisms for manipulating symbols, in order to be able to represent, modify and 
expand”, with more than 100 layers of learning instilled in the algorithm of these 
intelligent software.6 Also, for the development of cognitive skills in these computer 
systems, AI is often stimulated by the study of neurological function and promoted by 
neuroscience in general.7 
Thus, when applied to field of warfare, AI can create systems capable of operating, 
from target identification to their elimination, without direct human intervention, 
something that until now it was possible only in science fiction. This is what is called 
 
4Costa, E., & Simões, A. (2008). Inteligência Artificial: Fundamentos e Aplicações (3ª ed.). Lisboa: 
FCA.P.3. 
5Rodrigues, F. “A Inteligência Artificial na Defesa Nacional”. CEDIS Working Papers | Direito, Segurança 
e Democracia, No.59, (October 2018), p.7.  
6Shapshak, P. “Artificial Intelligence and Brain”. Bioinformation, Research Gate, (January 2018). 
Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/323283173_Artificial_Intelligence_and_brain . 




“autonomous weapon systems” (AWS). We are, therefore, one step ahead of drones, 
insofar as they are piloted from a distance and dependent, in their primary version, on 
the decisions of a human.8 
1.2 Autonomous weapon systems 
In light of the above, AWS already represent a paradigm shift, differing to a great 
extent from domestic computer systems as we know them. Even though computers are 
also previously programmed, they operate according to predefined rules and results,9 
whereas AWS are based on genetic algorithms and therefore technologically much more 
advanced, endowing the machine with the ability to think and autonomy to decide what 
is the best way to achieve the result for which they were programmed to.  
However, alongside AI, the definition of AWS has been the source of endless 
discussions among academics and has not yet found a consensus within the international 
community, being the “autonomy” element the one that raises the more divergence.10  
The reason for that is related to the fact that conceptualizing autonomy requires the 
gathering of many areas such as robotics, engineering, computer science and, once the 
discussion raises several legal issues, the Law.11 Indeed, autonomy can play a different 
role in different scenarios, understood by some as a “three dimensional concept”.12 Thus, 
the concept must be interpreted differently according to the complexity of the decision-
making process, the human-machine command-and-control relationship, or even the type 
of decisions or functions being made autonomous.13 
 
 
8Seixas-Nunes, A. (2017), Op.Cit. P.2.  
9Ibid. P.3. 
10Galleoti, S. “Under the Rule of LAWS: Artificial Intelligence in Warfare”, Security Praxis, (April 2019). 
Available at: https://securitypraxis.eu/under-the-rule-of-laws/ . Consultation date: October 8th 2019.  
11Boulanin, V.; Verbruggen, M. (November 2017). Mapping the Development of Autonomy in Weapon 
Systems. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. P.5.  
12Horowitz, M.; Scharre, P. “An Introduction to Autonomy in Weapon Systems”, Center for a New 
American Security, Project on Ethical Autonomy | Working Paper, (February 2015). Available at: 
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/188865/Ethical%20Autonomy%20Working%20Paper_021015_v02.pdf . 




Therefore, while some perspectives put the emphasis on the human involvement in 
the operation of AWS – we can name it the legalist perspective - some other prioritise its 
technical capabilities – a more technical or robotic perspective.  
According to the U.S. Department of Defence 2012 Directive on Autonomy in 
Weapon Systems, hereinafter named DOD Directive, an AWS is a weapon that “once 
activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human 
operator”. 14  
  
1.2.1 Addressing the different typologies of AWS 
To address the different types of autonomy that AWS are expected to have is 
fundamental in order to establish clear rules that aim to protect the main purpose of 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL): to balance civilian protection with military gains.  
Thus, from the standpoint of what we called “legalist approach”, the distinction is 
usually made between the human-in-the-loop, the human-on-the-loop, and the human-
out-of-the-loop15 in which the focus goes to the role of the human operator in the so 
called OODA cycle (observe, orient, decide and act)16, or, in other words, how much 
involvement would the human operator have during the cycle. 
Indeed, in the first case, there would be full human control during the whole OODA 
cycle, requiring human input at some stage of the task; in the second one, also called 
“human-supervised autonomous”, the system would operate autonomously while under 
 
14Department of  Defense, Washington DC (November 21, 2012) “Autonomy in Weapon Systems”, 
Directive Number 3000.09, Nov. 21, 2012.  
15This distinction first appeared on the 2012 Report of Human Rights Watch. See International Human 
Rights Clinic; Human Rights Watch.  “Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots - Report”, 
Human Rights Watch, (November 19th 2012). Available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/11/19/losing-
humanity/case-against-killer-robots . Consultation date: October 23rd 2019. 
16The ODDA (observe, orient, decide and act) cycle was first developed by John Boyd, an American 




the supervision of a human operator that can intervene if something goes wrong; and in 
the last one, the system would be able to act and decide without human intervention.17 
A more technical perspective on autonomy, in turn, differentiates between 
automatic weapon system, automated or semi-autonomous weapon system and 
autonomous systems. This approach emphasises the self-governance ability of the 
machine to deal with uncertainties in its operating environment.18  
Automatic systems are previously programmed systems in which it is necessary to 
enter certain data so that they respond as they are programmed to. Examples of such 
systems are small guns, which fire after the trigger is pressed, or anti-personnel mines 
that explode when pressed with the weight of a person, as previously programmed to do 
so.19 
Yet, the distinction between automated and autonomous system is highly debated 
and some authors do not recognize a major difference between the two concepts, seeing 
the second one as a more complex form of the first.  
Other authors such as ANDREW WILLIAMS20 state that autonomous systems are 
able of understanding intent and direction from the perception of its involving 
environment. Thus, “it is capable of deciding a course of action, from a number of 
alternatives, without depending on human oversight and control, although these may still 
be present. Although the overall activity of an autonomous unmanned aircraft will be 
predictable, individual actions may not be”.21 
MARIA PEREIRA22 also presents a distinction between the two concepts. 
According to this author, semi-autonomous weapon systems differ from the automatic 
ones in that they are able to autonomously define the necessary parameters, such as data 
analysis and observation. This means that semi-autonomous weapon systems have two 
 
17Garcia, E. V. “Inteligência Artificial, Paz e Segurança: Desafios para o Direito Internacional 
Humanitário”, Instituto de Pesquisa de Relações Internacionais (IPRI) Brasília, Cadernos de Política 
Exterior, No. 8, (2019), 1-15, p. 4. 
18Boulanin, V.; Verbruggen, M. “Mapping  the Development...”, Op. Cit., p. 6.  
19Pereira, M. (2017). Op. Cit., pp. 299-300. 
20Williams, A. (2015) – “Defining autonomy in systems: challenges and solutions” – On Williams, A.; 
Scharre, P. (org.) (2015) Autonomous Systems: Issues for Defence Policymakers. Norfolk, Virginia: NATO 
Communications and Information Agency. Pp. 33-34. 
21 Ibid. 
22Pereira, M. (2017). Op. Cit., pp. 299-300. 
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particularities: once activated, it will only engage targets that have been previously 
selected by a human operator23. Moreover, before acting, a human agent is consulted to 
decide whether the action will be carried out or not. 
This means semi-autonomous weapons are able to independently track and identify 
potential targets as well as prioritizing them or to make recommendations on when would 
be the best timing to fire.24  An example of these systems would be the South Korean 
sentinel robots25, the SGR-A1, that patrol the frontier between South and North Korea. 
This system uses infrared lens to recognize targets26 and has the capacity to “identify, 
track and shoot targets, although the latter phase currently requires human authorization”. 
Thus, this system is able to switch from automated to autonomous, fitting in the concept 
of “sliding autonomy”27. 
Another example is the Israeli antimissile “Iron Dome”. This system was 
developed to detect and to counter short range rockets while a control centre coordinates 
the response. The system is programmed to calculate where the rockets would fall, 
triggering the interceptor if the predicted trajectory falls in a populated area and ignoring 
it otherwise.28 
Finally, the most complex and those that raise the most legal issues are the 
autonomous systems. From the moment they are programmed, these have the ability to 
observe and collect data as well as to analyze them, define procedures and act according 
to defined procedures without needing any human assistance. 
Even though there are no known “fully” AWS in the sense of robots with human-
level cognitive capabilities, completely independent from human control (and for 
 
23Department of Defence, Washington DC (November 21, 2012) “Autonomy in Weapon Systems”, 
Directive Number 3000.09, Nov. 21, 2012. 
24Pereira, M. (2017), Op. Cit., pp. 299-300. 
25Ibid. 
26Ibid.  
27Boulanin, V.; Verbruggen, M. “Mapping  the Development...”, Op. Cit., p. 6. 
28Correia, A. “Como funciona a “Cúpula de Ferro”, o sistema israelita que interceta mísseis no ar”, JN, 
(May 6th 2019). Available at: https://www.jn.pt/mundo/como-funciona-a-cupula-de-ferro-o-sistema-
israelita-que-interceta-misseis-no-ar-10866232.html . Consultation date: April 29th 2019. 
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security reasons, is not even expected), if the weapon has the capability to independently 
select and engage targets, then we are in the presence of a fully AWS.29 
An existing/current example is the U.S. Navy’s Phalanx CIWS. This Aegis control 
system, operated in conjunction with Phalanx Close in Weapons System, is a defence 
system against anti-ship missiles, surface mines and aircraft. It has the ability to search, 
detect, track and evaluate independently. It also has engagement and kill-assessment 
functions.30 
Another example is encapsulated by the torpedo mines, nowadays used by China 
and Russia, known as the PMK-2. Unlike a classic extremely simple device mine, these 
torpedo mines are able to independently select and engage targets on its own whereas a 
classic mine is fixed and at least the mined area is known.  Therefore, these system are 
activated by a passing ship and, instead of exploding, it opens a capsule, releases a 
torpedo and engages the target. Thus, the created torpedo is not used to engage a 
previously selected target by a human agent neither is simply blowing up in a place.31  
However, regardless of the perspective one adopts, autonomy will always be 
integrated by three capabilities: sense, decide and act.32 Therefore, in a first phase the 
system perceives the environment through inherent sensors that collect and interpret 
information (data) – “sense”- afterwards, those data will serve has input for the decision 
process which, in turn, will be determined by the control system and how it was 
programmed. And ultimately, the result of the decision process will be exerted to the 
physical world.33 
 
29Crootof, R. “War Torts: Accountability for Autonomous Weapons”, University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review, Vol.164, No.6, (2016), 1347-1402, pp. 1368-1369. 
30General Dynamics, Ordnance and Tactical Systems. “Phalanx CIWS. Close-In Weapon System (CIWS)”, 
General Dynamics, Ordnance and Tactical Systems, Naval Platform Systems. Available at: 
https://www.gd-ots.com/armaments/naval-platforms-system/phalanx/ . Consultation date: May 5th 2020. 
31Scharre, P. “Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk”, Center for New American Security, Working 
Paper, (February 2016). Available at: 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_Autonomous-weapons-operational-risk.pdf . 
Consultation date: March 30th 2020, pp. 14-15.  
32US Department of Defense (DOD), Office of Technical Intelligence, Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Research and Engineering, Technical Assessment: Autonomy (DOD: Washington, DC, Feb. 
2015), p. 2. 
33 Boulanin, V.; Verbruggen, M. “Mapping  the Development...”, Op. Cit., pp. 7-9. 
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But regardless of the nature of each one of the perspectives described above, as 
stated by KERSTIN VIGNARD34, “ultimately the autonomy question is really about 
what control/oversight do we expect humans to maintain over the tools of violence that 
we employ”. Based on this premise and allied to the lack of consensus in defining 
“autonomy”, the international discussion switch its focus to discussing the level and 
range of desired “meaningful human control”.35 
 
 
2. AI in warfare:  Challenges posed to International Law 
Although some authors deny it is as a reality, AI technology applied to autonomous 
systems has been described as the third revolution in warfare, after gunpowder and 
nuclear arms36, raising many concerns, including legal and ethical. Thus, it is not a 
question of ‘if’ but when. 
In fact, states like the USA and the UK have already set themselves the goal to 
achieve full autonomy in AWS and others like China and Russia, although they have not 
clearly assumed this purpose, it is known that efforts are being made in the same 
direction.37 Regarding this subject, Vladimir Putin has even stated that “whoever 
becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world”.38 
In view of the above, the development of autonomous weapon systems has posed 
complex security challenges for the future of humanity39 and International Law. From 
 
34Vignard, K.  Statement of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research at the CCW Informal Meeting of 
Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, (April 12th, 2016). Available at: 
https://www.unidir.org/files/medias/pdfs/unidir-s-statement-to-the-ccw-informal-meeting-of-experts-on-
lethal-autonomous-weapon-systems-eng-0-648.pdf . Consultation date: May 1st 2020.  
35See. Report of the 2019 session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the 
Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, Geneva, 25–29 March 2019 and 20-21 August 2019.  
36Guiora, Amos N. “Accountability and Decision Making in Autonomous Warfare: Who is Responsible?”. 
Utah Law Review, Vol. 2017, No.2, Article 4 (2017), p. 2.  
37Pereira, M. (2017) “E se é o robot quem decide matar? Alguns problemas jurídicos dos sistemas de 
armamento autónomos.” In O alcance dos Direitos Humanos nos Estados Lusófonos. Santa Cruz do Sul: 
EDUNISC, 298-312, p. 298. 
38The Economist. (January 27th 2018) The next war: the growing danger of great-power conflict. London: 
The Economist, Special Report.  
39Pandya, J. “The weaponization of Artificial Intelligence”, Forbes, (February 14th 2019). Available at: 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/cognitiveworld/2019/01/14/the-weaponization-of-artificial-




the point of view of the legality of the AWS per se, questions arise whether it complies 
with the jus in bello, namely, with the principle of proportionality and distinction 
established as principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). In addition, doubts 
remain regarding accountability for a crime committed trough a weapon system in which 
no human agent engaged directly. 
In particular, in order to legally accommodate weapons with the ability to target, 
select and engage independently might demand the (de)construction of classic legal 
concepts such as mens rea and “effective control”. In any case, it is imperative to ensure 
the attribution of responsibility for illegitimate actions carried out through AWS before 
they take place in the battlefield. 
However, there is no consensus within the international community on how should 
AWS be addressed – regulation or total ban; this point will be covered in the next 
heading.  
 
2.1 Regulation versus Total Ban of AWS  
The total prohibition of the use of AWS systems may contribute to technological 
stagnation, but their proliferation may pose great risks to the security of both military 
personnel and civilians if their employment happens without strict regulation. Although 
it is too early to know the results of the development of Artificial Intelligence, some of 
these inventions already raise ethical and legal questions, even at the stage of 
development.  
In 2009, Noel Sharkey, an AI professor at the University of Sheffield, warned about 
the possibility of introducing autonomous weapon systems in a warfare context.40 Since 
then, some experts have advocated for a total ban on the development and application of 
artificial intelligence techniques to weapon systems.41  
 
40Seixas-Nunes, A. (2018) “Autonomous Weapon Systems: compatible with International Humanitarian 
Law?”, in Direito Internacional e o Uso da Força no Século XXI. Lisboa: AAFDL editor, 479-500, p. 487. 
41For instances, in 2013 a wave of advocates for the ban on the development and use of autonomous systems 
arises, with ONG’s such as Human Rights Watch, Article 36, International Red Cross and International 
Amnesty, as well as some states such as Bolivia, the Holy See, Peru, Pakistan, among others. In Seixas-
Nunes, A. (2017) Op. Cit., p. 3. 
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Others yet advocate regulation rather than a ban.  
In this context, we should note that the most recent gun ban took place in 1997, in 
Ottawa, in the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Storage, Production and 
Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on their Destruction. 
In 2013, the CCW Meeting of State Parties42, which aims to regulate weapons that 
can be considered excessively harmful or indiscriminate, decided that in the years that 
followed, governmental experts would hold informal Meetings to discuss the questions 
related to emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems 
(LAWS).43  
Only in 2016, during the Fifth Review Conference of the High Contracting Parties 
to the Convention on CCW, a Group of Governmental Experts (GEE) was established as 
an open-ended group on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons 
systems. 
During all of their meetings until 2019, many discussions having been carried out 
on the use of some systems of selective autonomy and the need for establishing minimum 
levels of human control but to date, there is no consensus among the international 
community neither on the hypothetical use of these systems in a war-like context nor the 
procedures for this weaponry legal review. 
While some authors argue “the troubling nature of autonomous warfare is 
manifested by the clear desire to minimize human involvement in its application”,44 
others manifest strong concerns regarding the lack of compliance with moral reasons. 
For instance, U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres stated that AWS “are politically 
unacceptable, are morally repugnant, and should be banned by international law”.45 But 
 
42Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be 
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. 
43The term “LAWS” has been adopted within the GEE meetings. In opposition to the term AWS, some 
authors criticize the adopted term is a misleading construct and carries a highly political baggage. In 
Trumbull IV, C. “Autonomous Weapons: How Existing Law Can Regulate Future Weapons”, Emory 
International Law Review, Vol.34, (2020), 533-594, p. 538. 
44Guiora, Amos N. Op. Cit., p. 27.  
45António Guterres, U.N. Secretary General, Remark at the Lisbon Web Summit 2018. Available at: 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sgsm19332.doc.htm . Consultation date: May 23rd 2020.  
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although the importance of considering moral reasons should not be undermined, this 
dissertation will focus only on legal evaluations in order to judge this matter. 
Interestingly, it has been pointed that there are some potential humanitarian 
benefits in the use of AWS. It is believed that AI technology could enable these systems 
to have higher precision, accuracy and speed46 and thus making AWS more discriminate 
than other weapons, reducing the risk to civilians.47 
Thereby, even though autonomy represents, without a question, the core 
characteristic of AWS we do believe it is not the autonomy characteristic that by itself 
represents a “troubling nature” but the lack of objective standard regarding weapon legal 
reviews and the lack of clear regulation in order to ensure accountability. Instead, 
discussions on the legitimacy of AWS would be more productive if it there were less 
focus on conceptualizing autonomy and instead, ascertaining whether those capabilities 
would behave in accordance with IHL standards in an operational battlefield 
environment.48  
Thus, when discussing the possibility of a ban to the research, development and 
deployment of AWS some authors argue that, as AWS are also being developed by the 
private sector, a ban would be difficult to enforce49 and even counter-productive as it is 
very unlikely to deter States from acquiring these weapons, since a clear assumption in 
this direction was already publically stated.50 
We do defend the premise that technological evolution should take its course; 
however, the parameters in which it happens and how it happens should be regulated and 
controlled. It has become imperative to propose and discuss a legal framework that takes 
into account ethical and moral aspects, without however interfering with technological 
 
46Pandya, J. Op. Cit. 
47Trumbull IV, C. Op. Cit., p. 557. 
48Anderson, K.; Waxman, M. “Law and Ethics for Autonomous Weapon Systems: why a ban won’t work 
and how the laws of war can”, in Stanford University, The Hoover Institution (Jean Perkins Task Force on 
National Security and Law Essay Series), (2013) Available at: 
http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/AndersonWaxman_LawAndEthics_r2_FINAL.pdf . 
Consultation date: May 26th 2019, p. 19. 
49Trumbull IV, C. Op. Cit., p. 535. 
50 See. Note 37. 
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progress. And the same can be said about legal control over AWS legitimacy, safety and 
accountability before it takes place in the battlefield. 
Ultimately, we must consider whether the existing legal framework is sufficient to 
accommodate this complex new reality,51 taking into account the several disciplines 
involved in regulating this matter;  this will be covered in the next chapter. 
 
3. Relevant Legal Framework 
When addressing the use of AWS in warfare, several legal disciplines are involved 
in regulating this matter. This chapter will make a brief reference to the different roles 
and purposes of the Jus ad bellum, Jus in Bello, and Human Rights and International 
Criminal Law in order to clearly establish who can be held accountable/ should have 
responsibility for AWS unlawful acts which will be discussed in chapters 5 and 6. 
 
3.1.  Jus ad bellum 
Jus ad bellum or the Use of Force appears as a response to the discretionary use of 
force by States. After failing to achieve its purpose to preserve international peace, the 
Covenant of the League of Nations (LoN) gives rise to the entry into force of the Charter 
of the UN, hereinafter, The Charter, after WW II.52 
Setting the goal to create an efficient system that enforces international peace by 
restricting the use of force between States53, the Charter established what is recognized 
today as a jus cogens norm, i.e., a mandatory norm of general International Law54 (IL): 
the prohibition of the use of force. Indeed, article 2.º/4 established that “all Members 
 
51Brehm, M. “Defending the Boundary. Constraints and Requirements on the Use of Autonomous Weapon 
Systems Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law”, The Geneva Academy of International 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Academy Briefing No.9, (May 2017), 1-73, p. 10. 
52Lopes, A. (2020) – “Uso da Força e Direito Internacional”, in Lopes, José Alberto Azeredo (coordenador) 
(2020) – Regimes Jurídicos Internacionais. Vol.1, 1ª ed., Porto: Universidade Católica Editora, p. 9-14. 
53CICV. “O DIH e outros regimes legais – jus ad bellum e jus in bello”, Comitê Internacional da Cruz Vermelha, (October 
29th 2010). Available at: https://www.icrc.org/pt/doc/war-and-law/ihl-other-legal-regmies/jus-in-bello-jus-ad-
bellum/overview-jus-ad-bellum-jus-in-bello.htm . Consultation date: April 24th 2020. 
54Lopes, A. (2020) – “Uso da Força …” Op. Cit., p. 14. 
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shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”. 
The established prohibition is directed, in the foreground, to the member States on 
the international plan, in order to protect States sovereignty and avoid interference in the 
State’s internal affairs.55 However, the prohibition established by the provisions is 
equally binding on all States and International Organizations (IO), given its customary 
value, leaving only aside non-state actors such as terrorist organizations.56 
On a different note, this provision relates to both the prohibition of the threat of the 
use of force and also the use of force itself noting that the concept of “force” is much 
broader than the concept of “war” used in previous legal instruments as in the Covenant 
of the LoN and in the 1928 Briand-Kellogg Pact.57  
 
3.2. Jus in Bello and International Human Rights Law 
While Jus ad bellum aims to regulate the legitimacy of the use of force, 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) intends to limit the effects of an armed conflict 
without prior judgments as to its origins.58 Thus, IHL primary purpose is to regulate the 
conduct of hostilities and, in the face of that reality, “refuse indifference” as stated by 
MARIA ISABEL TAVARES.59 
Similarly, as the Jus in Bello, IHRL has a relevant role when ascertaining the 
legality of a new weapon in the battlefield. Namely, both aim to protect human life and 
dignity. However, while IHRL presupposes a situation of peace in order to fully 
maximize the realization of human rights, IHL requires the existence of a conflict in order 
to be applied.60  
 
55Lopes, A. (2020) – “Uso da Força …” Op. Cit., p. 35-36. 
56Ibid. P. 28-29. 
57Ibid. P. 29-31. 
58Tavares, M. (2020) – “Direito Internacional Humanitário”, in Lopes, José Alberto Azeredo (coordenador) 
(2020) – Regimes Jurídicos Internacionais. Vol.1, 1ª ed., Porto: Universidade Católica Editora. pp. 221-
222.  
59Ibid. P.220. 
60Ibid. P. 223-224. 
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In the face of the above, armed conflicts, internal and international, are intensively 
regulated by scattered international legal instruments. However, the main legal 
instruments of IHL are enshrined in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and by the two 
Additional Protocols of 1977, all of which have been widely ratified.61 
As a cornerstone of the Law in the regulation of armed conflicts, IHL and in 
particular, pursuant to the Martens Clause, set out in Article 1º/2 of the Additional 
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions62, hereinafter Additional Protocol I (AP I), both 
the conduct of hostilities and the use of new weapons must be subordinated to the general 
principles of international law, which will be covered in chapter 4.  
 
3.3. International Criminal Law 
Lastly, the problem of AWS also involves International Criminal Law (ICL). When 
ascertaining the possibility of war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide being 
carried through AWS, criminal liability would arise under the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), circumstance we will analyse further in chapter 5. 
Moreover, in addition to the above mentioned crimes, as of July 17th 2018, the ICC 
has jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, which has been ratified 39 State Parties, 
including Portugal. Yet, while the above mentioned crimes imply serious violations of 
IHL, the crime of aggression represents a violation of the rules of the Jus ad bellum63. 
Indeed, the rapid technological evolution is one of the major elements of tension 
between the Law and social reality64 raising the question whether a crime committed 
through AWS or, for instance, a cybercrime, could be considered a crime of aggression. 
However, not neglecting the relevance of this quarrel, this issue is outside the scope of 
this paper. 
 
61The Geneva Conventions have been ratified by 196 State-Parties while AP I as been ratified by 174 and 
AP II by 168 States.  In, Tavares, M. (2020) – “Direito Internacional Humanitário” Op. Cit. Pp. 214-215 
62Being the complete designation “Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of the Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), of June 1977”. 
63Tavares, M. (2020) – “Direito Internacional Humanitário”. Op. Cit. P.268. 
64Lopes, A. (2020) – “Uso da Força …” Op. Cit., p. 209. 
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4. Ascertaining the legality of AWS under IHL 
The role of IHL is to limit the right of the parties to freely choose the methods and 
means used in war for humanitarian reasons, it can be easily understood that this rules 
must not be ignored in the presence of new weapons65.  
As such, this chapter explores whether AWS can be considered categorically 
prohibited under IHL.  
 
4.1. Martens Clause 
First introduced in the 1899 preamble to Hague Convention II on the Laws and 
Customs of War and Land, and later on introduced in the Additional Protocol I of 1977, 
the martens clause states that “in cases not covered by the law in force, the human person 
remains under the protection of the principles of humanity and the dictates of the public 
conscience”. 
As such, the clause creates a legal obligation for States to consider moral 
implication in the development or adoption of a new weapon by requiring compliance 
with principles of humanity and dictates of public conscience. Therefore, the first 
question that rises is whether AWS are able to comply with these principles. 
For the Arms Control Association, who advocates for a total ban of the AWS, the 
answer would be undoubtedly no. It is said that fully autonomous weapons, would not 
be able to comply with these principles since it requires “humane treatment of others and 
respect for human life and dignity”.66 This argument is grounded on the idea that the 
decision to shoot at a target or not would be based on the use of algorithms and thus 
would fail to respect human dignity.67  
 
65Pereira, M. (2014) Noções Fundamentais de Direito Internacional Humanitário, Coimbra: Coimbra 
Editora, p. 3. 
66Docherty, B. “REMARKS: Banning ‘Killer Robots’: The Legal Obligations of the Martens Clause”, Arms 
Control Association, (October 2018). Available at: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-





Likewise, Human Rights Watch decry AWS would lack both legal and ethical 
judgment which ultimately gives “people the means to minimize harm”.68 
Interestingly, on the same subject, JOSHUA HUGHES69 takes a completely opposite 
position by underlining the need to make a strict distinction between legal concepts and moral 
or ethical ones when addressing the concepts of “principles of humanity” and “dictates of 
public conscience”. And the real importance of doing so, the author stresses, lies on its 
effects - “while compassion provides a motivation to act humanely, legal and ethical 
judgment provides a means to do so”.70  
In any case, in order to be considered lawful under International Law, AWS must 
prove to be able to comply with the laws of war, which will be discussed at the end of 
this chapter. 
 
4.2. Principles of International Humanitarian Law 
 The importance to ascertain whether the use of AWS is legitimate under 
International Law and International Humanitarian Law is intimately related with its 
ability to comply with the principles of distinction and proportionality, ruled by the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) as the cardinal principles of IHL.71 
Therefore, what we intend to ascertain is whether given the particularities of AWS, 
these would be able to comply with the rules and principles of International Law. 
 
A. Principle of Proportionality 
 
68Docherty, B.; Humans Right Watch “Heed the Call - A Moral and Legal Imperative to Ban Killer Robots”, 
Human Rights Watch, (August 2018).  Available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/21/heed-
call/moral-and-legal-imperative-ban-killer-robots . Consultation date: January 23th 2020. 
69Hughes, J. “No, autonomous weapon systems are not unlawful under the Martens Clause”, Media 
Corporation, (August 2018).  Available at: https://medium.com/@jghughes1991/no-autonomous-weapon-
systems-are-not-unlawful-under-the-martens-clause-2653d18790e9. Consultation date: February 2nd 
2020. 
70Ibid.  




As a cardinal principal in the conduct of hostilities, the principle of proportionality 
is regulated in several international instruments, namely, in the Additional Protocols 
(AP) I and II and in the Rome Statute.  
The principle of proportionality establishes that in the conduct of hostilities during 
an armed conflict, parties to the conflict must not launch an attack whenever the damage 
is expected to be excessive in view of the anticipated military advantage.72 Pursuant to 
the Rome Statute73, “intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack 
will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or 
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be 
clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage 
anticipated” constitutes a war crime under international armed conflicts (IAC).   
 Thus, in order to comply with this principle, AWS would have to be able to 
analyze a plurality of factors and, in a complex and unpredictable scenario, evaluate a 
situation in which surprise factors will inevitably arise.  
 Although these will always be context-dependent assessments, it has to be 
safely guaranteed that these systems are designed to efficiently anticipate several 
scenarios in order to comply with the principle of proportionality. 
 
B. Principle of Distinction 
 The principle of distinction, laid down in article 48.º of AP I, requires that a 
distinction be made between combatants and civilians and between civilian and military 
assets. Consequently, indiscriminate methods of attack are prohibited under IHL. 
 In this sense, pursuant to article 51.º/4 of AP I, the means and methods 
employed in an attack have to be directed at a specific military object, under penalty of 
 
72Pursuant to article 51.º/5/b) of Additional Protocol I, “an attack which may be expected to cause incidental 
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”. 




unlawful action under the terms of IHL. Moreover, the lawful use of AWS also depends 
on the compliance with AP I regarding the prohibition against certain kinds of attacks, 
namely, those who aim at objects considered indispensable for the survival of civilian 
population, the natural environment and installations containing dangerous forces 
respectively, as established in articles 54.º et seq., of AP I. 
 Thus, this principle requires for an AWS to have the capability of not only 
distinguishing between legitimate and non-legitimate targets, but also, to carry the attack 
in a discriminatory manner.74 
 
4.2.1 Preliminary conclusions: can AWS be considered categorically 
prohibited under IHL? 
In view of the above, we can find three common arguments against AWS 
compliance with IHL. First, an autonomous system would fail to comply with IHL 
principles by not being endowed with emotions. Second, AWS would lack legal and 
ethical judgment to act in accordance with international rules. And lastly, this system 
would fail in complex situations.  
 
i. An autonomous system would fail to comply with IHL principles by not being 
endowed with emotions. 
Autonomous systems would, in fact, lack the ability to have emotions and 
therefore, its decisions would not be made under compassionate reasons. 
Nevertheless, even though compassion is, in fact, an inherent capacity of human 
beings and undeniably useful in some circumstances, that does not mean it is useful in 
the majority of them. In fact, the ability to feel compassionate for others can be a way of 






Indeed, the particularity of not being endowed with emotions may guarantee that 
an autonomous system could make proper judgement of the proportionality of an attack, 
considering its consequences without being motivated by fear or resentment. 
However, in order to comply with the principle of distinction, several variables 
would have to be foreseen and previously determined into AWS. For instance, which 
kind of weapon should be used so that military advantage is gained while the amount of 
damage created is not excessive, or how many casualties would be acceptable. 
Furthermore, the system will have to be programmed in such a way that it will decide 
what might be excessive in each circumstance.75 
If, on the one hand it seems to us premature to conclude the impossibility to insert 
an algorithm capable of meeting all the mentioned variables, on the other hand, we 
wonder if it is humanly possible to previously determine all these scenarios. Thus, the 
issue is not if autonomous weapon would able to comply with how it was programmed 
to behave bur rather if it is humanly possible to foresee all this variables. In any case, the 
main problem is not whether these machines would be as fallible as a human agent in the 
same situation, rather on whom would the responsibility fall in case it does fails. 
Similarly, regarding compliance with the requirements imposed by the principle of 
distinction, some authors argue that autonomous systems, by not being endowed with 
emotions, would be able to assess, in a more effective and more objective way, which 
targets to hit.76 Moreover, autonomous systems are capable of holding a big amount of 
data which could entail a great advantage in order to comply with the principle of 
distinction.  
In order to understand the scope of this advantage let’s consider a terrorist attack. 
While it represents one of the biggest challenges posed to the security of humanity, a 
terrorist would look exactly like a civilian. It might act in a way that would suggest his 
intention, or it might not. What we know for certain is that it will not wear any clear 
symbol of a military combatant as his intention is, wittingly, to be confused with a 
 
75Wagner, M. “Taking Humans Out of the Loop: Implications for International Humanitarian Law”. 
Journal of Law, Information and Science. Miami Law Research Papers Series. (July 2011). Available at: 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/JlLawInfoSci/2012/9.html . Consultation date: October 10th 2019, p. 
8. 
76Pereira, M. (2017). Op. Cit., p. 305. 
32 
 
civilian. In such case, there is a need to identify and eliminate the target in accordance 
with the principle at issue.  
While this may pose a herculanean assignment for a human agent, whose success 
would be more dependent on his experience in the battlefield rather than a technical 
aspect, posing great difficulty, an AWS could rely on unlimited information available in 
the virtual world,77 with relative ease. As AFONSO SEIXAS NUNES78 underlines, “if 
we take into account the information available in social media, it will be easy to conclude 
that an autonomous system can quickly establish patters of life, conduct and location for 
millions of individuals at the same time”.  
In that case, defending or not the use of AWS in warfare context, intelligent 
systems would hold an unquestionably advantage when compared to human agents in 
compliance with the principle of distinction, by having an ability beyond humane to 
search and storage millions of information regarding different people, in a matter of 
seconds.   
However, it must be assured that AWS would be able to perform in accordance 
with these capabilities both in an abstract way79 as in a battlefield context knowing that, 
pursuant to articles 50.º/1 and 52.º/3 of AP I, when in doubt, the presumption must be 
that the target is not legitimate.80  
Therefore, it seems for us clear that so far, we cannot state that the use of an AWS 
or even the weapon per se is unlawful under IHL. Yet, one thing is certain: if the AWS 
is not equipped with the ability to assess the proportionality of the attack it intends to 
carry out and to proper distinct legitimate and illegitimate targets, its use will not be 
lawful under international humanitarian law. 
 
ii. AWS would lack legal and ethical judgment to act in accordance with 
international rules. 
 
77Seixas-Nunes, A. (2017). Op. Cit. P. 3.  
78Ibid. 




Regarding the second argument, it seems to be related with the first one: AWS 
won’t be capable to comply with the laws of war because it lacks legal judgement. 
However, as technology advances, this argument seems to be even more fragile than the 
first one. 
As stated by SIMON CHESTERMAN81, while humans must be trained, AWS 
could have these rules internalized in its system and act in compliance with them without 
fatigue, fear or anger to get in the way. Therefore, it is possible and highly likely that 
AWS not only would be able to comply with laws of war, but actually can be 
programmed to be more capable of compliance than humans.   
 
iii. AWS would fail in complex situations. 
Regarding the last argument that autonomous systems would fail in complex 
situations we are forced to partially agree. Indeed, AWS cannot be programmed so 
perfectly to act accordingly in unpredictable situations. However, neither could a human 
agent. 
As such, this appears to be a weak argument against AWS in a warfare context as 
the real concern behind it, once again, it is not really the ability of these systems to act in 
accordance with legal parameters in limitless scenarios, but instead, if the operator would 
be able to predict and program them in advance.82 Therefore, the real issue on this topic 
is, whereas a human could be held accountable for an unlawful act pursuant to 
International Law the same cannot be said so clearly about a system who would act 
without direct human input. 
In conclusion, AWS do not appear to be, as such, unlawful under the rules of IHL. 
However, it remains to be ascertained whether the regulation of weapons legal reviews 
as currently in force are sufficient in order to ensure AWS compliance with IL. 
 
 
81Chesterman, S. “Artificial Intelligence and the problem of autonomy”. Notre Dame Journal on Emerging 




4.3.  The obligation of weapons review: particular challenges 
In compliance with article 36.º of Additional Protocol I83, it is the responsibility of 
the State that intends to adopt a new weapon to certify its legality under IHL 
requirements. 
Thus, the new weapon must comply with the two substantive rules in this article: 
first, it should not cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injuries84 and secondly, the 
rule against inherently indiscriminate weapons, pursuant to article 54.º of the I Additional 
Protocol. Thus, it is understood that a weapon is, by its nature, indiscriminate when it 
cannot be aimed at a specific target, being highly likely to strike both civilians and 
combatants85. 
But the fact that an AWS takes the final decision, although this may pose an ethical 
question, it does not appear to violate, in itself, the provisions by IHL as long as it is 
possible to provide enough information to the device to guarantee that the attack will be 
aimed at a legitimate target.86 Therefore, a State has the obligation to ensure the 
autonomous system has all the needed capabilities to perform in accordance with IHL. 
However, several problems arise with the application of this article. Namely, even 
though this obligation is well established, the corresponding certification is done by each 
State. The current interpretation of article 36.º enables each State to freely choose the 
means and methods to certify the legality of a particular weapon87, which may not offer 
global certainty as these procedures are confidential. Besides that, it does not contemplate 
ethical requirements.88 
Moreover, with the rapid pace these technologies are evolving it is becoming clear 
that unlike other weapons, the design of AWS will rapidly evolve to systems that are 
 
83“In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare, a High 
Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine whether its employment would, in some or all 
circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the 
High Contracting Party”. 
84Pursuant to article 35.º/2 of AP I “ it is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and 
methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering”. 
85Anderson, K.; Waxman, M. Op. Cit., p. 10. 
86Ibid, pp. 11-12. 
87Ibid, p. 4. 
88Garcia, E. V. Op. Cit., p. 7. 
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capable of learning online or during their deployment – this is what the scientific 
community calls as “machine learning”.89  
As these systems may be constantly re-parameterizing and reprogramming 
themselves, an important question arise as to know when these internal modifications 
would require a new legal review. And to simply wait for a clear change in its behaviour 
to occur would not be safe.  
Thus, AWS may require constant testing and evaluation which demands the 
implementation of new methodologies. Foreseeing this issue, the United States, for 
instance, are already conducting development of a new method of continuous testing and 
evaluation by programming the systems to report its learning and modifications.90 
Ultimately, this continuous testing would foresee behaviours that might not be 
legal under IL forcing the relevant State to stop reckless acts. Whatever method is chosen 
it will have to guarantee its safety for use in warfare context, and assuming responsibility 
for its continuous legality under both international norms and principles. 
In conclusion, although these systems do not appear to be illegal per se under IHL, 
the most pressing issue noted in this chapter relates to the uncertainty regarding 






5. General remarks on accountability 
 
89Boulanin, V.; Verbruggen, M. “Article 36 Reviews: Dealing with the Challenges posed by emerging new 
technologies”, Stockolm International Peace Research Institute, (December 2017). Available at: 
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2017-12/article_36_report_1712.pdf. Consultation date: February 
26th 2020, pp. 24-25.  
90Boulanin, V.; Verbruggen, M. “Article 36 Reviews...”. Op. Cit., pp. 24-25. 
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“There can be no justice in war if there are not, ultimately, responsible men and 
women.”91 
Ensuring accountability is not only important by itself but also because allowing 
for impunity would bring serious consequences for international peace.92 If no link 
between Law and Moral is ensured, war as we know it would be conducted without rules 
or limits and therefore, without respect for both human dignity and life.  
When addressing the possibility of integrating a weapon system with the capability 
of operating autonomously in the battlefield, we must not ignore the fact that not only it 
might commit war crimes but, at some given point, inevitably will. However, while it is 
materially possible for AWS to commit acts amounting to war crimes or crimes against 
humanity, by lacking moral agency, these systems could not be held responsible as the 
direct agent of the unlawful conduct.93  
Thus, having explained about the unlikely possibility of AWS being considered 
categorically prohibited, on the next heading we will address the elements of 
international accountability under the rules of ICL, namely, the legality principle and the 
mens rea, as a mechanism of International Humanitarian Law enforcement.  
   
5.1.  Elements of international criminal responsibility  
A. Legality Principle 
As in any legal matter, the ground to hold someone accountable for his unlawful 
act or acts is based on the legality principle. Thus, ICL predicts accountability for any 
 
91Walzer, M. (1979). Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. New York: 
Basic Books, pp. 287-288. 
92Kirsch, P. (President of the International Criminal Court). 
“Applying the Principles of Nuremberg in the ICC. Keynote Address at the Conference “Judgment at 
Nuremberg” held on the 60th Anniversary of the Nuremberg Judgment”. International Criminal Court, 
(September 30th2006) Available at: https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ED2F5177-9F9B-4D66-9386-
5C5BF45D052C/146323/PK_20060930_English.pdf . Consultation date: March 1st 2020. 
93Amoroso, D.; Tamburrini, G.“The ethical and legal case against autonomy in weapons systems”, Global 
Jurist, (2017). Available at: https://www.degruyter.com/view/journals/gj/18/1/article-20170012.xml . 
Consultation date: March 23th 2020, p. 15. 
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unlawful behaviour, regardless of the agent who committed it, as long as it constitutes a 
criminal offense under national or international law. 
In international law this principle is stated in articles 22.º and 23.º of the Rome 
Statute and are represented, respectively, by the Latin maxims nullum crimen sine lege 
(NCSL) and nulla poena sine lege. 
Translated to “no crime without law” and “no punishment without law”, these 
principles establish that no one shall face criminal punishment for an act that was not 
criminalized by law at the time it was committed.94 Aiming to ensure the legal certainty 
principle and to protect human rights, NCSL are also embodied in article 11. º, number 
2, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)95 which states that "no one 
shall be held guilty of any penal offense on account of any act or omission which did not 
constitute a penal offense, under national or international law, at the time it was 
committed."  
Likewise, under the ICRC Rule 156 established as customary international law 
applicable in international and non-international armed conflicts, “serious violations of 
international humanitarian law constitute war crimes”. By “serious” it is intended not 
only a violation that involves protected persons or objects, but also a conduct that 
breaches important values despite the fact that does not physically endangered a person 
or object.96  Therefore, those violations would give rise to criminal liability. 
Accordingly, taking in consideration the ratio of this principle and even demands 
of certainty and humanity, there is no reason to conclude that a violation of IHL would 
be left unpunished simply because it was an AWS the direct agent of the unlawful act.  
B. Mental element/ mens rea 
In international law, criminal liability is designed to punish serious violations of 
IHL carried out intentionally. 
 
94Van Schaack, B. “Crimen Sine Lege: Judicial Lawmaking at the Intersection of Law and Morals”, The 
Georgetown Law Journal, Vol.97, No. 119 (January 1st 2008), 119-192, p. 119. 
95Ibid, p. 174. 
96ICRC. “Rule 156, Definition of War Crimes”. IHL Database, Customary IHL. Available at: https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule156 . Consultation date: February 26th 2020. 
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Pursuant to chapter 3 of the Rome Statute, referred to as “General Principles of 
Criminal Law”, article no. 30. º establishes that responsibility depends on a criminal act 
whereas the material elements of the crime fulfil two requirements: they are committed 
with intention and knowledge.  
By “intention”, number 2 of the mentioned article states that it must be understood, 
regarding both the conduct and its effect, as the agent proposed to adopt the conduct and 
intended for the effect to occur or was “aware that it would take place in a normal order 
of events”. On the other hand, “knowledge” means awareness that a consequence will 
occur. 
If a case happens whereas the operator used the AWS with the intention of 
committing a war crime or without having fulfilled his obligations, the current rules 
established in ICL will be appropriate97 to address the accountability for the crime 
committed. 
However, if the system causes damages through an unpredictable behaviour, the 
matter of accountability will not have a straightforward answer. When combining a 
highly complex system to a particularly rapid pace of response, it is not unlikely that a 
human agent will not be able to correct its action in time for a disastrous consequence, 
either because the system reacted faster than the human agent could predict, or it can 
simply happen that their complexity can make their behaviour incomprehensible to 
human operators.98 
Due to their particular nature, malfunctions and coding errors, or even in the 
possibility of bugs or cyber attacks, could entail disastrous consequences99 without 
knowledge or intent of the occurred. Therefore, in any of those cases, the machine will 
in fact carry out the criminal behaviour without, however, meeting the two requirements 
stated above: having the knowledge or intent.  
Nevertheless it is factually and morally impossible to hold the system accountable, 
by allowing AWS to make independent decisions on the battlefield, we are before a break 
 
97Crootof, R. Op. Cit., p. 1389. 
98Scharre, P. Op. Cit., p. 27. 
99Ibid. P. 8.  
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in the chain of command and therefore responsibility has to be “traced back to some 
persons in the decision-making chain”.100  
Indeed, although these autonomous systems act independently, it does not act 
wilfully, and therefore are “incapable of committing a chargeable offense”101.  
Thus, concerns arise on whether ICL has proper instruments to enforce 
accountability if certain functions are delegated without a human agent to have effective 
control over it. Indeed, if there are no supervision obligations that must be fulfilled, it is 
not plausible that the requirements of knowledge and intention would be legally fulfilled. 
So the matter of accountability for a crime without anyone to link the direct 
intention for the created result seems to not have a clear answer in the mens rea 
requirement as currently interpreted. Therefore, it appears to be crucial to clearly 
establish those obligations in order to avoid a responsibility gap and to prevent disastrous 
consequences to happen without no one to be held accountable. 
 
6. International Responsibility for unlawful acts carried through 
AWS 
In order to achieve its main purpose of protecting individuals, effectiveness 
demands that accountability be enforced in the event of a violation of IHL rules or 
principles. Indeed, it must be ascertained who can be held accountable for an unlawful 
act carried through AWS and the legal basis for it. 
Thus, even though IHL creates obligations primarily for States, specially attending 
its ius cogens nature, it is peacefully accepted it is also binding to international 
organizations (IO) and it also sets out legal obligations for individuals such as military 
personnel, combatants and civilians.102 
 
100Amoroso, D.; Tamburrini, G. Op. Cit., p. 15. 
101Crootof, R. Op. Cit., p. 1380. 
102Tavares, M. (2020) – “Direito Internacional Humanitário”. Op. Cit. Pp. 266-267. 
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As mentioned before in this paper, the accountability issue raised by AWS in the 
battlefield is intensified by the large number of subjects that might have responsibility if 
a crime is committed. Thus, having ascertained who has the obligations to comply with 
IHL, we will first address the State Responsibility and later the possibility of individual 
liability. On the final part of this heading, we will explore these two types of 
responsibility and make final conclusions on accountability regarding unlawful acts 
committed through AWS. 
Given the scope of this dissertation, the responsibility of IO or the potential liability 
of private parties to the conflict are not covered in this paper. 
 
6.1.  Ascertaining States Responsibility for AWS unlawful acts 
State Responsibility103 for wrongful acts first took place after the atrocious acts 
committed during WW II as a form of remedying human rights violations.104 Therefore, 
the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials were the first instances to address State Responsibility 
for unlawful acts.  
Not neglecting the potential harm of AWS, it seems undeniable that its deployment 
comes with a lot of advantages too. And when ascertaining the likely strategic, humane 
and financial advantages of the usage of AWS, it appears that States are the main 
beneficiaries of its use. Otherwise, we would not be facing a worldwide race for 
acquisition and deployment of these weapons. 
As mentioned previously, the basis of State Responsibility can be found in 
numerous international treaties and in Customary International Law. 
State Responsibility has two cornerstones: failure to comply with its international 
obligations, on the one hand, and for the practice of international wrongful acts, on the 
other. 
 
103Since “State Responsibility” is an established term in the law, the text of this paper shall use ‘state 
responsibility’ to refer to “state accountability.” 
104Malik, S. Op. Cit., p. 631.  
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Pursuant to the common article 1.º of the Geneva Conventions, States have a 
general obligation to comply with IHL.105 In fact, the Geneva Conventions states several 
ways in which States can assure such requirements. Namely, States are under an 
obligation to disseminate the legal provisions of IHL, both to civilians and the military.106 
Moreover, States must ensure IHL standards in a way that ensures safety on non-
combatants as established in articles 51.º and 58.º of AP I. 
Moreover, article 2.º/4 of the Charter establishes an obligation for member States 
to refrain from the threat or use of force on the international plan. 
State Responsibility is based on customary international law after the Special 
Rapporteur Ago proposed to the International Law Commission (ILC) to codify the 
distinction between ordinary and aggravated State responsibility.107 
In 2001, the ILC adopted the Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA). The attribution of international responsibility 
to a State must be seen in three stages: the origin, the existence of international 
obligations and lastly, the implementation of countermeasures that guarantee the 
fulfilment of those same obligations.108 
Pursuant to article 1.º of the ARSIWA, “every internationally wrongful act of a 
State entails the international responsibility of that State” whereas article 2.º o establishes 
that  “there is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an 
action or omission “(a) is attributable to the State under international law; and (b) 
constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State”. Aggravated State 
Responsibility, on the other hand, is currently established in articles 40.º and 41.º. 
Moreover, when establishing States Responsibility regarding AWS unlawful acts 
two things must be ascertained: the moment when responsibility should be established 
 
105Common article 1.º of the Geneva Conventions states that “The High Contracting Parties undertake to 
respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances”. 
106 Art.º 83.º AP I. 
107 Bonafè, B. Op. Cit., p. 19. 
108Tavares, M. (2020) – Responsabilidade Internacional dos Estados por Factos Internacionalmente Ilícitos” 
- In Lopes, José Alberto Azeredo (coordenador) (2020) – Regimes Jurídicos Internacionais. Vol.1, 1ª ed., 
Porto: Universidade Católica Editora, p.727-728. 
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and whether a State can be held responsible for an unlawful act where no human agent 
engaged directly.  
Regarding the first part, for reasons of efficiency, the definition of State 
Responsibility cannot depend on the moment when the attack takes place (or “the timing 
of the attack”), but on the moment the system is activated. Whatever happens during the 
deployment of the AWS for the mission for which it was trusted to comply with IHL 
requirements, it will be responsibility of the State. And according to the maxima ubi 
commoda, ibi incommoda, by being the primary beneficiary of AWS development and 
deployment, States must remain all times responsible for their actions. 
Regarding the second part, article 4.º of the ARWISA enshrines a general principle 
for the attribution of conducts to the State, according to which "the conduct of any State 
organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law". Thus, it 
concretizes the principle of the State unity.109 
In consequence of violating a legal obligation, the State must fulfil all obligations 
set out in articles 28.º et seq. namely, to cease that act, to offer assurance of non-repetition 
and make full reparation for the injury caused. The reparation can operate in the form of 
restitution, compensation or satisfaction, regardless of the source of the legal 
obligation.110 The purpose would be to eliminate the consequences of the illegal act, in 
the case of reparation, or to restore the situation to the one that existed before the 
wrongful act was committed111 or omitted. 
In cases where restitution shows materially impossible or inappropriate, 
compensation, as a monetary payment for assessable damage112, may be more adequate, 
or even a combination of both.113 Satisfaction, on the other hand, may consist in an 
acknowledgment of the breach or formal apology, as stated by article 37.º ARSIWA. 
Nevertheless, the same article emphasizes the need to comply with the proportionality 
principle by recognizing the satisfaction cannot be a form of humiliation to the 
responsible State. 
 
109Tavares, M. (2020) – “Responsabilidade Internacional dos Estados …” Op. Cit. Pp. 642-643. 
110Crootof, R. Op. Cit., p. 1355. 
111Gillard, E. “Reparation for violations of international humanitarian law”, International Review of the Red 
Cross, Vol.85, No. 851 (September 2003), 529-553, p. 531. 
112Cfr. Art.º 36.º ARSIWA. 
113Cfr. Art.º 34.º ARSIWA. 
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However, if the State’s illegal act falls under the aggravated State Responsibility 
requirements, it raises obligations for all States in the international Community, namely, 
the obligation to cooperate to the end of the violation, not recognize as lawful “nor render 
aid (...) in maintainaining that situation.”114 
Finally, on the third moment of international responsibility attribution, 
countermeasures can be implemented in order to guarantee the fulfilment of the State’s 
obligations under the limits established in the Law of States Responsibility and with 
respect for the principle of proportionality. 
 
6.2. Individual criminal responsibility 
One of the foundations of ICL is the Latin brocade nulla poena sine culpa. 
Intimately related with the above mentioned legality principle and mental element 
requirement, it means that criminal responsibility lies on the moral responsibility. Or, as 
stated by the Court, “the foundation of criminal responsibility is the principle of personal 
culpability”. Therefore, it means no one shall be held criminal responsible for acts he has 
not personally engaged.115  
The need to hold individuals accountable for unlawful actions was first set out in 
the judgement of the Nuremberg Tribunal in which it was famously declared that “crimes 
against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by 
punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law 
be enforced.”116 Hereinafter, the “Nuremberg Principles” were recognized as customary 
international law by the UN General Assembly and formally codified.117 
 
114Cfr. Art.º 41.º ARWISA. 
115Prosecutor v. Tadic Judgment Case No. IT-94-1-A ICTY Appeals Chamber 15 July 1999. Parag. 185-
187. Available at: https://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf. Consultation date: 
March 20th 2020. 
116Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment 
of the Tribunal, International Law Commission Report on the Work of Its Second Session, (1950). 
Available at: https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/7_1_1950.pdf   
117General Assembly Resolution 95 (I), “Affirmation of the Principles of International Law  recognized by 




Even though at the time the Nuremberg Tribunal did not, and could not predict the 
existence of AWS, and therefore mentioning “abstract entities” cannot be employed 
literally in this context, the legacy of the Nuremberg Trials brought to international law 
two main principles: first, the idea of individual accountability for international crimes 
and second, the idea of a fair trial to all individuals which would safeguard the rights of 
the accused. 
The first of those recognized principles states that “any person who commits an act 
which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefore and liable to 
punishment.”118 
Currently, the subject of individual criminal responsibility is best regulated in the 
Rome Statute, pursuant to articles 25.º et seq.  
Therefore, on the following topic we will discuss the possibility of individual 
responsibility of programmers and military personnel, under existing rules of ICL. 
 
A. Programmer 
The process of decision of AWS, that is to say, the means and methods used to 
achieve the result pre-determined by a human operator will depend to a large extent on 
AWS in-built artificial intelligence.119 Indeed, its software is the ultimate foundation of 
these system's determinations.120 
Pursuant to article 30.º of the Rome Statute, as previously mentioned, in order to 
establish culpability is needed to prove mens rea. But even though the programmer acting 
 
118This principle is also laid down in article 7(1) of the Statute of International Tribunal for the Prosecution 
of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, henceforward Statute of the International Tribunal, which 
states:“A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the 
planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in Articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be 
individually responsible for the crime.” 
119Malik, S. Op. Cit., p. 634. 
120Wagner, M., (2014), op. Cit., p. 1404. 
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is, in fact, mens rea, the programmer’s action would have to be negligent.121 However, 
International Law does not recognize other type of culpability that it is not dolus directus.  
In fact, one of the challenges for holding the programmer accountable for negligent 
behaviour is the machine-learning intrinsic characteristic of AWS. Giving their ability of 
self-learning both online and in the field, AWS may use the means and methods it was 
given to make decisions not always possible for a programmer to foresee. Thus, given 
the dynamic environment where an AWS is expected to perform, it may not be possible 
to predict the behaviour of the AWS software.122 
Also, AWS are extremely complex devices which a large number of people are 
expected to be involved in its development,123 which may likely rise the “many hands” 
problem where the collective responsibility of the group for a particular outcome may be 
diluted and, as a consequence, no individual can often be held accountable for it124. 
In order to overcome this, some authors suggest a link of causality must be 
previously determined by extracting from the group of people involved in the process of 
developing the AWS, the ones who are directly responsible for the system's 
performance.125  
As regards programmers or designers being held accountable for negligent 
behaviour, some authors126 claim that is a possibility only if the responsible subjects 
failed to supervise the development of AWS software or proper monitor its behaviour 
during the learning process.  
SWATI MALIK127, on the other hand, claims that, if the crime is not a result of 
dolus directus, the possibility of holding the programmer accountable will depend on the 




123Malik, S. Op. Cit., p. 634. 
124Amoroso, D.; Tamburrini, G. Op. Cit., p. 15. 
125Ibid., p. 635. 
126Wagner, M. (2014), Op. Cit., p. 1405. 
127Malik, S. Op. Cit., p. 634. 
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damage. Although the author added that in order to ascertain accountability in these 
terms, dolus eventualis128 would have to be accepted has a form of intent. 
However, not only negligent culpability is excluded from current interpretation of 
the art.30.º of the Rome Statute but also ICL generally does not recognise negligence as 
being sufficient to establish criminal culpability.129 
 
B. Command Responsibility 
Command responsibility is based on the principle that the individual who is in 
command of a certain action, remains responsible for its results whether it took direct 
participation in its perpetration. In the context of AWS, a commander’s responsibility 
includes operator liability.130 
It is the case of a responsibility based on "a personal dereliction of duty on the part 
of a superior who was bound by a duty to act to prevent or punish the crimes of 
subordinates and who culpably failed to fulfil this duty". 131 Thus, responsibility of the 
superior will arise if it fails to fulfil his duty to prevent the illegal action. 
Pursuant to article 28.º of the Rome Statute, superior responsibility is established 
whenever the forces under the effective command control, or authority and control, of 
the military commander commit a crime as a result of his or her failure to exercise proper 
control over such forces. However, this responsibility is limited to cases in which the 
commander knew or should have known about the crime and failed to take all necessary 
measures to prevent it or repress it. 
If a situation happens where AWS are sent to operations in which would exceed 
their capabilities to comply with IHL, the superior’s responsibility appears rather 
 
128In the author view, “Dolus eventualis is such intent through which an individual is conscious of the 
likelihood of other illegal ramifications emanating from her actions yet she goes ahead with carrying out 
her principal actions." In Malik, S. Op. Cit., p.634, note 84. 
129McDougall, C. “Autonomous Weapon Systems and Accountability: Putting the Cart before the Horse”, 
Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, No. 58, (2019), 58-88, p. 67. 
130Malik, S. Op. Cit., pp. 635-636. 
131Mettraux, Guénaël (2008) – Command Responsibility in International Law – The Boundaries of Criminal 
Liability for Military Commanders and Civilian Leaders, PhD dissertation, University of London The 
London School of Economics and Political Science, Law Department, p. 15. 
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unproblematic.132 But that would only happen in a context where all conditions are 
known in advance, which does not realistically cover most of the scenarios in the 
battlefield. 
Therefore, respecting the establishment of mens rea, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has stated the fulfilment of the criteria of what the 
superior “should have known” is met if the commander receives information that puts 
“him on notice of the risk of […] offences by indicating the need for additional 
investigation”. The Tribunal also clarified, the received information does not have to 
include specific details but rather is enough that “he possessed information sufficiently 
alarming to justify further inquiry” in order to established the superior’s means rea.133 
In a case of indirect liability as this, the commander has effective control over his 
subordinates in such a way it is able to oversee his actions and capable of punishing any 
violation of the given orders.134 However, regarding AWS it is not clearly establish what 
a proper control over the system has to be in order to create a legitimate link between the 
AWS unlawful act and the responsible’s failure to fulfil his obligation of proper control 
and prevention.  
Regarding this matter, it has been proposed to insert a recording device in AWS 
that would monitor and reconstruct what happens during the time of its operation. This 
would allow tracing its decisions and therefore create a path of accountability.135  
In that case, what is needed is not only to clearly establish what “effective control” 
has to be but also, to guarantee AWS are safely programmed to provide sufficient 
information and means to allow for the supervisor to repress an unlawful action. In that 
case, if the supervisor fails to prevent or repress such action, it could be held accountable 
under article 28.º of the Rome Statute. 
 
132Wagner, M. (2014), Op. Cit., p. 1406.  
133Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, July 17th 2008. Available at: 
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/strugar/acjug/en/080717.pdf . Consultation date: May 2nd 2020, Parag. 298-
299. 
134Crootof, R. Op. Cit., p. 1379. 
135United Nations, Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or 
arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns. U.N. Doc. No. A/HRC/23/47, (Apr. 9, 2013). Available at: 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session23/A-HRC-23-
47_en.pdf . Consultation date: March 22nd 2020. Parag. 81. 
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Therefore, one of the important reasons of ascertaining in advance who can be held 
accountable and under what circumstances is to avoid what is called a system of 
organized irresponsibility. That is to say a system whereas responsibility stumbles from 
one agent to the other and ultimately, no one there is to blame.136  
 
6.3.  Relation between individual and State Responsibility 
Indeed, the same criminal behaviour could give rise to either individual or State 
responsibility.  
But the relation between State Responsibility and individual accountability, 
regarding its overlap or strict separation, it’s a complex and controversial one, being 
possible to find traits that denounce its overlap while others imply their independence. 
Thus, the overlap of these two types of responsibility can first be found in its 
common origin as both of them were developed around the concept of erga omnes 
obligations. This is to say, in both cases responsibility arises for the breach of an 
obligation owed to the entire international community.137 
The relation between these two different very important branches of responsibility 
is not clear, especially when different courts, framed in different legal regimes, have to 
pronounce on the elements of crimes entailing individual responsibility and those that 
entail state responsibility.138 
Indeed, the enforcement mechanism to individual responsibility is divided in 
different jurisdictions in a mixture of international and domestic criminal courts139 – ad 
hoc tribunals with jurisdiction in specific areas, national criminal tribunals, mixed 
tribunals, and the ICC, established by the Rome Statute but only binding to the State 
 
136Wagner, M. (2014), op. Cit., p. 1409. 
137Bonafè, B. (2009), Te Relationship Between State and Individual Responsibility for International 
Crimes. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 24. 
138Bonafè, B. Op. Cit., p. 1-4. 
139Ibid., p. 16. 
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parties. State Responsibility, on the other hand, is imputed by international courts, 
political bodies or, commonly, through the resort of international settlements.140  
However, one major difference can be found between the two regimes: while 
individual accountability entails a punitive function through the enforcement of ICL, the 
same cannot be said about State Responsibility. Indeed, in the long process of 
codification States has shown reluctant to the establishment of theirs criminal 
responsibility. In result, the ILC has eliminated all mentions that could entail the 
interpretation that State Responsibility is under a framework of criminal 
accountability.141 
Thus, in regards to the complex relation between State responsibility and individual 
criminal accountability, although they share common traits and admitting the probability 
where in some cases both individual criminal accountability and State Responsibility 
may arise, these are separate regimes and therefore it must remain clear that these forms 
of accountability are complementary and not alternative to each other.142  
 
6.4.   Preliminary Conclusions on Accountability for AWS unlawful 
acts 
Attending what has been stated throughout this chapter, if a case happens where 
the unlawful behaviour of the AWS cannot be subsumed to a failure to comply with its 
international obligations, the allocation of responsibility to a State party appears to be 
more challenging.  
Even though the ICJ already stated the viability of holding a State responsible 
despite the conviction of an individual, clarifying that “any other interpretation could 
entail that there would be no legal recourse available under the Convention in some 
readily conceivable circumstances”143, some authors defend there must be an agent or 
 
140Ibid., p. 193. 
141Ibid., pp. 226-227.  
142Chengeta, T. “Accountability Gap: Autonomous Weapon System and Modes of Responsibility in 
International Law”, Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, Vol.45, No.1, (2016), p. 2-3. 
143Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, parag. 180-182.  
50 
 
group of agents whose actions can be ascribed to a States authority and that those can be 
subsumed an internationally wrongful act – this is what SWATI MALIK144 nominates as 
“innate causality”.  
However, State responsibility must arise from the moment the weapon system is 
activated and regardless of the success of its operation or the unlawful act carried out 
recklessly. Indeed, in accordance with the principle of State unity and pursuant to article 
4.º of the ARWISA, States will always bare the weight of responsibility for the use of 
AWS regardless of individual responsibility that might arise. 
Therefore, States cannot be irresponsible for unlawful acts and the fact that the 
crime is committed through an autonomous weapon should not change this premise since 
the machine will always be an instrument to commit a war crime. Moreover, this precise 
idea has been reaffirmed within the GEE meetings on CCW145, regarding accountability 
in the context of AWS, where general understanding reached since 2017 was that States 
bear responsibility for acts carried out by AWS deployed under their authority. 
In conclusion, not only States are morally more responsible for the hypothetical 
use of AWS but are also internationally responsible for the means of violence they decide 
to employ. Indeed, the ultimate decision to deploy autonomous weapons in an 
international armed conflict will be a State decision and therefore it is the responsibility 
of that State to ensure its compliance with IHL in all stages of the ODDA cycle. 
However, for reasons of legal certainty, the possibility to hold a State responsible 
in those terms must be clearly poured into a binding regulation in order to avoid 
disastrous scenarios from happening without no one to hold liable for. 
 
 
7. Refusing Impunity 
 
144Malik, S. Op. Cit., p. 631. 
145Created in 2016 during the Fifth Review Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention 
on CCW, the GEE was established as an open-ended group on emerging technologies in the area of lethal 
autonomous weapons systems.  
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The previous chapters attempted to deconstruct the complex reality that surrounds 
AWS and the current legal framework already in place. Throughout this paper, we have 
been discussing several characteristics and different scenarios for these autonomous 
systems and how they relate at different levels with the Law.  
AWS should not be addressed as “agents in war” but instead as “tools” to achieve 
a military goal. Even though AWS has the ability to perform some task autonomously 
and technological evolution will most likely allow it to operate fully autonomously in the 
future, its role in the battlefield can only be internationally acceptable if it proves to 
comply with IHL rules and principles and responsibility in case of AWS unlawful acts 
can be ascertained and enforced. 
Indeed, given that AWS and unlawful acts thereof are a complex new topic with 
legal challenges that have never been addressed before, it will be necessary to draft and 
implement specific legal instruments to regulate authorized capacities on autonomous 
mode, clarify obligations regarding its use and supervision and, lastly but not least, 
stipulate a revision system that efficiently attests its safety.  
Thus, we defend the establishment of a regulatory system that accommodates 
efficiently the imminent use of autonomy in weaponry through a legal document that 
ensures international agreement on all the critical issues as well as equal binding, in 
particular, regarding accountability on the use of AWS in the battlefield. However, 
attending the legal weapon review process is a known topic of international disagreement 
with highly political weight a more careful approach should be implemented through a 
political declaration on this issue through which States would compromise on crucial 
procedures that ensures humanitarian protection. 
 
7.1. Protocol on the development and deployment of weapons capable 
of operating autonomously 
International peace would benefit from the establishment of a legally binding 
Protocol that takes in consideration technological advancements to happen in a not-so-
distant future. Thus, the object of this legally binding instrument would be to regulate 
the use of autonomy in weapon systems rather than to only focus on autonomous systems. 
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This would enable international legislator to overcome what it seems to be a stalemate 
on the definition of “autonomous system” while it would allow covering a bigger 
spectrum of weaponry to be developed in the future.  
Given the drastically different technological realities, an international legally 
binding protocol should establish fundamental principles to be complied with in the 
development and deployment of AWS, as it was discussed within the CCW meetings of 
2018 and 2019. Those principles must contain legal and ethical criteria for the regulation 
of future weapons legal reviews. Namely, it should be clearly stated that IHL principles 
and requirements apply to AWS and human responsibility exists during all stages of the 
ODDA cycle.146 
Second, it is of pressing importance to clearly establish the obligation for State 
Parties to design and monitor the compliance with codes of conduct that will bind 
programmers and engineers to respect the set of principles established in said Protocol 
during the development stage while also establishing the obligation to State Parties to 
comply with this principles in the development of new autonomous weapons. While 
programmers would be held accountable for failing to comply with the binding Code of 
Conduct enforced by the State in which it was created, States would be held responsible 
for the breach of any international obligation. 
Third, safety and humanity reasons demand international agreement on what 
specific functions and decisions could be left for autonomous systems in the battlefield, 
while meeting both certain ethical and legal criteria. In this sense, it has been advocated 
that States will need to develop national rules of engagement (ROE) and enforce norms 
of professional behaviour, “in order to inform what can be expected of a reasonable 
commander”.147 By designing and limiting AWS’s field of action, the accountability of 
States and military commanders would be legally founded on the failure to fulfil their 
international binding obligations clearly poured under the Protocol. 
 
146Report of the 2019 session of the GEE. Parag.17.  
147 Trumbull IV, C. Op. Cit., p. 589.  
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But regardless of the well established State responsibility for IHL violations, the 
international legislator would have to clearly incorporate in the Protocol that an 
unpredictable result caused by AWS should give rise to State Responsibility. 
In this regards, it must remain clear that AWS ability to perform autonomously 
must not be confused with supervision. While autonomy means the ability to act and 
make decisions without being controlled, supervision lies on the obligation of a certain 
person to ensure something or someone behaves within the established set of rules.  
Autonomy will indeed transform how humans interact with weapons but will not 
eliminate their role.148 Therefore, it is of great importance to regulate who would be able 
to supervise AWS during its development, ensuring their specific training, in order to 
create a clear path of accountability. 
 
7.2. International Political Declaration 
As previously stated, the current system of weapons legal reviews in place offers 
very little transparency and international certainty. Thus, in order to, on the one hand, 
give the supervisor enough security in order to operate the AWS and on the other hand, 
avoid an accountability gap, the current weapons review system must be greatly 
improved. 
Thus, a political declaration on AWS legal reviews would be a more effective 
approach in order to establish an international binding agreement on an uniform system 
of revision that sets out objective standards and requirements regarding legal reviews.  
Moreover, it would be crucial for States to agree and compromise on specific 
standards and requirements for technical aspects such as the establishment of certified 
quality control measures in production process149, duration of time in which AWS could 
be on autonomous mode and the margin of error considered to be acceptable and in 
accordance with IHL rules and principles. 
 
148 Boulanin, V.; Verbruggen, M. “Mapping  the Development...”, Op. Cit., p. 119.  
149 Trumbull IV, C. Op. Cit., p. 571. 
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Ultimately, safety reasons and certainty demand that State parties conduct their 
reviews on a regular basis in accordance with  a transparent and cooperative revision 
process, similar to the one implemented pursuant to article 7.º of the Ottawa 
Convention150, while complying at the same time with the objective standards 

















150Formally named Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-





“To every man is given the key to the gates of heaven. The same key opens the 
gates of hell. And so it is with science.”  
- Richard Feynman 
As we been discussing throughout this paper, the imminent use of AWS in the 
battlefield poses complex issues which the established IL cannot currently address and 
deal with. Even though AWS do not appear to be categorically unlawful under the rules 
of the well established IHL and thus the Jus in Bello will continuously serve its purpose 
independently from the means of violence used to achieve the military goal, the same 
cannot be stated about the possibility of accountability for AWS unlawful acts. 
Although it is materially possible for AWS to commit war crimes through its 
independent conduct, autonomous systems do not act wilfully and therefore lack moral 
agency to be held responsible for its unlawful acts. However, it is not legally or morally 
acceptable to allow a weapon system to act in the battlefield without strict rules to ensure 
accountability for unlawful acts committed through them. 
Indeed, the imminence of AWS in the battlefield has brought to surface the 
fragilities of a weapons review system that seems very much unprepared to protect 
principles of humanity offering very little certainty and even less transparency. 
Moreover, the current system of accountability opens the door for too many people to be 
accountable and still, leaves very little certainty of that liability not to be diluted in none.  
Given the complex challenges of accountability raised from the use of autonomous 
weapons in the battlefield, the time is ripe to rethink the current regulation in force and 
upgrade it to a system that ensures the efficiency of the existing legal framework given 
the risk of becoming obsolete in the face of a new weaponry reality. Thus, a legally 
binding protocol is required that regulates AWS authorized capabilities on autonomous 
mode and clarifies obligations regarding its use and supervision. Moreover, it is of 
pressing need to establish an international agreement on transparent and cooperative 
procedures for weapon legal reviews that ensures humanitarian protection. 
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However, it must remain clear that, given that the ultimate decision to deploy 
autonomous weapons in an international armed conflict is always a State decision, State 
Responsibility must be determined at the point in time that autonomous systems are 
activated and regardless of the success of its operation or the unlawful act carried out 
recklessly.  
Therefore, States cannot exempt themselves from liability regardless of the 
negligence of the programmer or the unlawful act being the result of a reckless conduct. 
Also, given the maxima “ubi commoda, ibi incommoda”, not only States are the main 
beneficiaries of the use of such systems but also, given their international obligation to 
comply with IHL, they are also the main party responsible in the eventuality of unlawful 
acts being committed through AWS and must remain responsible through all stages of 
the ODDA cycle. 
To conclude, future discussions on the topic would benefit from focusing on the 
human-machine relation, rather than on the machine itself, through a preventive approach 
rather than a reactive one, ensuring its durability. Discussions that focus on the concepts 
and nature of the machines will inevitably be outdated rapidly, considering the stunning 
speed of its expecting development. Therefore, focusing on prevention, supervision and 
accountability would open doors for better understanding which ultimately would give 
rise to international agreements based on consensual starting points and converging 
perspectives. 
Ultimately, principles of certainty, legality and humanity demand a clear catalogue 
of obligations regarding AWS and how accountability and culpability will be determined 
for those who fail to fulfil said obligations. As things stand under the current legal 
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